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Although effectiveness and efficiency are old comrades of 
public administrations, they still often cause unintended 
consequences. The paper addresses the success/failure of 
reforms and the outcomes thereof. It claims the core prob-
lem of rational decision-making lies not in rationality per 
se, but in a lack of concept and/or insufficient attention to 
the behaviour of complex adaptive systems. With the help 
of complex adaptive systems, cybernetics, and combina-
tions of effectiveness and efficiency, the paper presents the 
essential elements for adaptive (human) decision-making 
(such as diversity, variation, selection, adaptation, and in-
tegration), as the framework whereby unintended, reverse, 
and neutral effects can be reduced. New rules/decisions 
should be based on different levels of planning and adap-
tation, and on moving from the general to the more specif-
ic, in accordance with context specificity and unplanned, 
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emergent things. It seems the hardest thing to address is 
the human character that does not (want to) recognise a 
situation as the situation in which some things must be 
spotted, evaluated, and changed if needed.
Keywords: effectiveness, efficiency, complex adaptive sys-
tems, public administration, decision-making
One of the most remarkable and sorely lamented patterns of hu-
man affairs is also one of the most obscure in origin: the culmina-
tion of action in effects directly contrary to those that were intend-
ed. (Sieber, 1981, p. 3)
1. Introduction**2
For Hamilton (one of the founding fathers of the USA) “the true test 
of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good 
administration” (Hamilton et al., 2008, p. 356). He also warned that “a 
dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal 
for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal 
for the firmness and efficiency of government” (Hamilton et al., 2008, p. 
13). Hamilton was basically addressing the relation between effectiveness 
and efficiency and he was right: many wrongs have been done in the name 
of different isms, but the efficiency of government per se is blind and can 
lead to new isms. In recent decades, EU countries have begun with public 
reforms as “[d]eliberate changes to the structures and processes of public 
sector organizations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) 
to run better” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 2). To “run better” is a very 
general notion and can refer to anything that could increase goal-fulfil-
ment or a ratio between inputs and outputs; i.e., everything that can be 
more effective or efficient. To be effective is “to get the right things done 
[while] efficiency is the ability to do things right” (Drucker, 2002, p. 2). 
** This paper is based upon work supported by the Slovenian Research Agency under 
Grant No. J5-8238 (The development of a holistic governance model for an efficient and 
effective Slovenian public administration).
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With the help of this distinction, this paper will reveal some discrepancies 
in the practical use of these notions.
Although effectiveness and efficiency (E&E) are old1 comrades and con-
tinually used, this paper claims that a relation between (absent) effective-
ness and (overly emphasised) efficiency remains unresolved. Based on the 
legal documents described below and on case law, the paper will show 
that E&E are used interchangeably, and despite the presence of negative 
effects, it comes as a surprise that important documents still address E&E 
without a procedure or methodology whereby the content of these terms 
could be more clearly elaborated. The goal is not only to achieve a clear-
er meaning, but to accomplish results with the fewest possible negative 
effects. Alongside different management reforms, decision-makers must 
not lose sight of the whole: all reforms are only specific answers to inade-
quate earlier reforms, and it could be valuable to go one step back, to see 
how/why different reforms have emerged. If the big picture is not taken 
into account, a space for different paradoxes emerges, and, for instance, 
NPM was/is no exception. This paper will test the presumption(s) that the 
problem of rational decision-making tools may lie in:
a)  a propensity to trust rational problem-solving based solely on experts’ 
disregards for opposite effects of altruistic actions based on people’s 
values and emotions (this factor makes experts unable to carry out 
predictions because their mental frameworks cannot systematically 
comprehend non-rational effects), 
b)  a lack of conceptual structure to estimate the probability of opposite 
effects lead to accommodating or adapting actions, and 
c)  unquestioned methods whereby power holders interpret or label ac-
tions as effective or efficient. 
The paper will focus on understanding the differences between E&E and 
equity from a systemic/cybernetic point of view because – despite conti-
nuity of use – these terms are used interchangeably, are not used in the 
correct sequence, or in the right pairs. There are numerous examples of 
texts which mention E&E, but they do so in the context of their use, 
without an emphasis on their combinations and newly emerged (mostly 
1 The principle of effectiveness was known as early on as Roman times in the dictum 
ut res magis valeat quam pereat – an interpretation that validates outweighs one that invali-
dates (Scalia & Garner, 2012). Ambrogio Lorenzetti painted the Allegory and Effects of Good 
and Bad Government in his frescoes in the years 1337–1339. They can be viewed in the Pala-
zzo Pubblico in Siena, Italy (Carli, 1983).
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unintended) consequences. For this purpose, a decision tree will be used 
to demonstrate the probability of an E&E pair by means of the Bayes’ 
theorem. This theorem presented by means of a decision tree will show 
which effects are relevant for the probability of E&E success and what 
kind of unintended consequences may arise as a result of different E&E 
combinations. The latter will also be compared with the immune system 
to demonstrate a proper course of action and a model will be presented 
whereby things will be placed in “cybernetic order”.
2.  Examples of Mixed Use of Effectiveness and 
Efficiency
2.1.  The European Union’s Understanding of Effectiveness 
and Efficiency
The European Commission, e.g. in its 2001 White Paper on European 
Governance, proposed an enhanced dialogue with civil society, better use 
of expert advice, and better impact assessment to improve the quality of 
policy proposals. Among the five principles of good governance (open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence) effec-
tiveness addresses impact (as an element of efficiency) and divides the 
indivisible (effective policies and objectives).2 With Article 4 of the Trea-
ty on European Union (TEU)3 the principle of effectiveness became the 
prevailing guide for the future determination of authorisations underlying 
the functions and powers of institutions. In Article 298 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)4 lays the legal ground for 
2 Policies must be effective and timely, delivering what is needed on the basis of clear 
objectives, an evaluation of future impact and, where available, of past experience. Effective-
ness is used to implement EU policies in a proportionate manner and on taking decisions at 
the most appropriate level (European Commission, 2001).
3  The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of 
the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives.
4 Official Journal C 326 of 26/10/2012.
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European law on good administration.5 These two legal grounds present 
a proper understanding of the relations between E&E (effectiveness – 
objectives; efficiency – the manner whereby objectives can be achieved), 
which is more vague in the effet utile or the principle of effectiveness (for 
which efficient [not effective] legal protection may sometimes be more 
appropriate).6 The EU Court can raise7 the effet utile of the Treaty as a 
whole,8 of European law (Hauer,9 Factortame10), of a specific policy area 
(Van Eycke11), or of a specific Treaty article (Bosman12) (here it is valid to 
speak of effectiveness). Article 19(1) of the TEU states that “[M]ember 
States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protec-
tion in the fields covered by Union law”. The right to effective judicial 
protection is determined in the EU by Article 47 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union, which is a binding provision of 
primary law in the EU legal order; it implies an open, discretionary notion 
of efficiency (to facilitate the achievement of tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise them) to attain effectiveness (objectives). 
E&E are mentioned in the most important legal documents of the EU; it 
is therefore relevant what measures may be appropriate to ensure fulfil-
ment of obligations and what kind of facilitation may be suitable for the 
achievement of tasks (or abstention from measures which could jeopard-
ise the attainment of objectives). On the other hand, the mere mention 
5 In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration.
6 The effective judicial protection obliges the EU Member State courts to ensure that 
national remedies and procedural rules do not render claims based on EU law impossible in 
practice or excessively difficult to enforce. Opinion of AG Jääskinen delivered on 7 February 
2013 in Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG, Donauchem 
GmbH, DC Druck-Chemie Süd GmbH & Co KG, Brenntag Austria Holding GmbH, 
Brenntag CEE GmbH, ASK Chemicals GmbH, formerly Ashland-Südchemie-Kernfest 
GmbH, ASK Chemicals Austria GmbH, formerly Ashland Südchemie Hantos GmbH. 
Here efficiency could be better: the statement is focused not on goals, but on the difficulty 
of their achievement.
7 The approach was first canvassed in Case 13/77 GB-INNO-BM SA v Association 
des détaillants en tabac (ATAB) [1977] ECR 2115.
8 Case 2/74 Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 00631.
9 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 03727.
10 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame 
Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-02433.
11 Case 267/86 Pascal Van Eycke v ASPA NV [1988] ECR 4769.
12 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association v Jean-Marc 
Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921.
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of effectiveness indicates the problem of how it is to be achieved: every 
word in legal acts must be considered to have effect and the previously 
mentioned Article 47 should also be valid without the word “effective”;13 
the added word per se points to some kind of disadvantage, not to the lack 
of a word, but to the way in which the word should be put into practice. 
From the examples above it is clear that there is a need to understand the 
holistic unity of E&E. 
2.2.  Different Cycles of Emphasis on Efficiency at the 
Expense of Effectiveness and Vice Versa
A public management reform – popular in many OECD countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s – known as “New Public Management” (NPM) is an 
example of E&E under inclusiveness. It included efforts to reinvent (“en-
trepreneurial”) government with a shift towards privatisation, quasi-pri-
vatisation, contracting out, and public–private partnerships, away from 
core government institutions with independent executive agencies to slow 
down or reverse government growth in public spending and staffing, with 
the introduction of performance measurement and results-oriented man-
agement systems, with greater responsibility and accountability for public 
managers, greater competition in the public sector, and the like (Cole & 
Eymeri-Douzans, 2010; Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2011). Although NPM focused on results, the reforms listed 
above are examples of efficiency, not of effectiveness: these reforms are 
for the most part techniques or procedures whereby better results can be 
achieved, and not results per se. NPM did not address what is right or 
wrong (what values people have), but solely how to be the best at doing the 
right or wrong things. It seems both parts should be addressed together.
It is no accident that in response to NPM other doctrines in public ad-
ministration have emerged and addressed what NPM had left out: ef-
fectiveness (i.e., the right things, values). This can be seen in the new 
public service (serving, not steering) (Denhardt, J. V. & Denhardt, 2011; 
Denhardt, R. B. et al. 2013), which places a strong emphasis on ethics 
and the reaffirmation of democratic values, citizenship, and service in the 
public interest; on  the principles of good administration (Parliamentary 
13 The meaning of Article 47 should be no different without the word “effective”: Every-
one whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to 
a remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
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and Health Service Ombudsman, 2017; The Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman, 2009) and on good administration through a better 
system of administrative procedures (OECD, 1999; SIGMA, 2012). New 
public service also emphasizes governance as “the involvement of society 
in the process of governing” (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 7); as governing 
processes that are “hybrid and multijurisdictional, linking plural stakehold-
ers in complex networks” (Bevir, 2010, p. 3), or as the “participatory pro-
cess of governing the social, economic, and political affairs of a country, 
state, or local community through structures and values that mirror the 
society [and] include the state as an enabling institution, the constitution-
al framework, the civil society, the private sector, and the international/
global institutional structure within limits” (Farazmand, 2004, p. 11). The 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) 
is a rare example which mentions E&E, equity and inclusiveness among 
the principles of good governance, in addition to participation, consen-
sus-orientation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and the rule 
of law (2009). Emphasizing only one or only the other side in different cy-
cles always brings about shortcuts, surprises and paradoxes on both sides. 
This is true for NPM (Dunleavy et al. 2005; Hood & Peters, 2004; Slyke, 
2003), good governance (Dijkstra, 2013; Noore Alam & Mohd. Zin, 
2007; Velluti, 2009; Wilén, 2007), or any other reform. Decision-makers 
should not disregard the difference between theory and practice either: in 
addition to all the building blocks, i.e., theory, there is also practice, which 
could achieve completely different results than those stated as objectives. 
Theory and practice must be closely connected and the same stands for 
E&E, from both a theoretical and a practical perspective.
3.  Effectiveness and Efficiency
Tönnies previously dealt with the relationship between E&E in his Ge-
meinschaft und Gesellschaft. With a focus on the universal clash between 
small-scale “communities” and large-scale competitive market “societies”, 
he drew a distinction between the traditional, emotional, supportive com-
munity as a collective, which uses natural, common law (Gemeinschaft) 
and the modern, rational or efficient society of rational individuals, who 
use statute law (Gesellschaft). He grouped both parts within the single 
concept of the state with a hybrid, dualistic character, which he thought 
was also required in public administration: “society is capable to apply 
a general will independently of the state … and the natural order deter-
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mines the position of individuals [based on which] … the state invests 
mandatory authority to individuals, until in the end every person partici-
pates in the will of the state … this idea is found to a limited extent in the 
system of public administration” (Tönnies, 2001, pp. 237–238).14 For We-
ber bureaucracy is founded on the scientific efficiency of sine ira et studio 
(without anger and fondness), but this kind of attitude – unlike in Tö nnies 
– questions the very roots of our personalities: “bureaucracy … develops 
the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy is “dehumanized”, the more 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, 
and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape 
calculation” (Weber, 1946, pp. 215–216). This is usually called the Webe-
rian paradox or “the irony of scientific efficiency improving our lifestyle 
while simultaneously undermining our meaning systems and emotional 
security” (Parrillo, 2005, p. 502). While Tönnies understood E&E in a 
more holistic manner within the state and society as a single unit, Weber’s 
paradox can be seen as NPM’s forefather.
The quality of public administration can be understood as the trinity that 
addresses efficiency as the ratio of maximising results vis-à-vis the resourc-
es used, effectiveness as the ratio of results gained to those planned, and 
equity. Why should equity be added? Not solely because it is one of the 
principles of good governance; the main reason lies in its connection to 
both efficiency an d effectiveness. One part of the whole is effectiveness 
as a necessary condition to achieve efficiency, while the other is equity 
as a starting point which gives the mental framework of perspectives based 
on a mix of courage, emotions, and reason.15 A mixture of those three 
gives preferences or social needs (wanted as direct outputs [results] or 
14 Tönnies’ concepts were also used by Weber, albeit with different, more fluid no-
tions of communal Vergeminsschaftung that is based on a subjective feeling of people who 
belong together, while Vergesellschaftung is based on associative relationships that rest on 
rationally motivated adjustments of interests that may be “affectual or traditional” (Weber, 
1978, pp. 40–41).
15 This trinity constitutes Plato’s parts of the soul as a (good/bad) combination of 
thymos, eros and nous (Plato, 1976). Equity is needed as a ground/parametre/predisposition 
or as a mental framework whereby E&E are evaluated. Equity was emphasised in the 1970s 
by the so-called New Public Administration, whose theory emerged from the subsequent 
meetings of the Minnowbrook Conference (Frederickson, 1989; Frederickson et al., 2012; 
Waldo & Miller, 2006), most notably from the social equity argument: “laws and regulations 
are often ineffective guides for administrators trying to determine what to do. However trite 
this observation may seem, laws and regulations are better at telling administrators what not 
to do than what to do … Social equity values have to do with the fairness of the organization, 
its management, and its delivery of public services. Social equity asks these questions: For 
whom is the organization well managed? For whom is the organization efficient? For whom 
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more indirect outcomes [effects]), also known as effectiveness. Efficiency 
without effectiveness is almost meaningless; it is more essential to do the 
right things (effectiveness) than to do the wrong things in the right way. 
Despite this intuitively correct inference, there is more: as is the case 
whenever there are two elements, there are four combinations, and to 
fully describe E&E their combinations should be stated. If every form of 
the administration of society is “about activity – how people act and how 
they might act more effectively and more justly” (Bevir, 2010, p. 11), it is 
relevant to know how to act in the proposed way. Effectiveness and effi-
ciency are closely linked and could be synonyms for quality and outcome. 
They must be addressed within the same framework: because there are 
four combinations for every two parts, this also holds true for E&E.16 
Decision-makers cannot create more efficient plans to anticipate future 
changes (because efficiency depends on effectiveness); they must apply 
decision-making techniques with relevant sensors or indicators of change 
in the actual framework of space and time and in the appropriate order17 
to first accommodate effectiveness based on equity. Key decision-makers 
in public administration must ensure a way to communicate the final re-
sults and measurable impacts of the performance of public administration 
to the people, because it is only the people who can provide the deci-
sion-makers with relevant/democratic weights or ponders on the impor-
tance of a goal (regardless of the fact that a different weight is attached to 
the same goal in other countries). What is therefore effective in one coun-
try is irrelevant for another, as long as these countries do not have com-
mon frameworks (e.g. as do the member countries of the EU, OECD, or 
ECHR). If these elementary conditions had been built into New Public 
Management, there would have probably been fewer reverse or unintend-
ed effects. And here is where the paradox lies: despite the power that is 
vested in the people, not only do public administrations more or less do 
their work without public opinion or community profiling, they mostly do 
not even anticipate the unintended consequences of their decisions. 
is the organization economical? For whom are public services more or less fairly delivered?” 
(Frederickson, 2010, pp. 14, 15).
16 A good decision and a good outcome; a good decision and a bad outcome; a bad 
decision and a good outcome; and a bad decision and a bad outcome. 
17 For Drucker, an effective executive makes decisions as part of a systematic process 
with clearly defined elements and a distinct sequence of steps (1. classifying the problem; 2. 
defining the problem; 3. specifying the answer to the problem; 4. deciding what is “right” rath-
er than what is acceptable; 5. incorporating into the decision the action to carry it out; 6. test-
ing the validity and effectiveness of the decision against the actual course of events) (1967).
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4.  Unintended Consequences of E&E Relations
Well-intentioned actions almost always (also) produce unwanted effects. 
In ancient Greece, the temple of Apollo at Delphi bore the inscriptions 
gnothi seauton (know thyself), meden agan (nothing in excess), and, accord-
ing to Plutarch, a large letter “E” (1936). While Plutarch gives seven pos-
sible explanations,18 we would like to believe it is meant to represent the 
five human senses (which render human beings human in the first place, 
or as Delphi might say: “you are”), whereby humans can help themselves 
reason “if” something can be done (in this manner the letter “E” could also 
stand for effectiveness, efficiency, and equity). It could be said that an-
cient Greek remedies for unwanted effects were impartiality, moderation, 
and action, whereby humans use all their senses and/or abilities to achieve 
goals. In all forms of complex adaptive systems (CAS) negative/positive 
(neutral) effects are present due to emergence as the characteristic element 
of CAS: “[a]n emergent property is a global behaviour or structure which 
appears through interactions of a collection of elements, with no global 
controller responsible for the behaviour or organization of these elements. 
The idea of emergence is not reducible to the properties of the elements” 
(Feltz et al., 2006, p. 241). The whole is not only more than the sum of 
its parts, but what “the whole” is or could be cannot be known in advance; 
it only emerges through interaction, by emergent combinations that rise 
exponentially with a greater number of parts or relations: two elements 
(e.g. effectiveness and efficiency) yield four combinations (like in any oth-
er combination of nr or 22), four elements result in sixteen combinations, 
and so on. This is very similar to the butterfly effect, where tiny causes can 
have significant effects (Lorenz, 1963). 
If decision-makers could agree with the idea of emergence at a gener-
al/organisational level, this results in a “surprise” for decision-making: 
problems do not only pre-exist before their solutions/decisions, but also 
emerge spontaneously in the course of multiple relations as problem-solv-
18 (1) It was dedicated by the Wise Men, as a protest against interlopers, to show that 
their number was actually five and not seven (EI = E, five). (2) EI is the second vowel, the 
Sun is the second planet, and Apollo is associated with the Sun (EI = E, the vowel). (3) EI 
means “if”: people ask the oracle IF they shall succeed, or IF they shall do this or that (EI = 
“if”). (4) EI is used in wishes or prayers to the Apollo (EI = “if” or “if only”). (5) EI, “if”, is 
an indispensable word in logic for the construction of a syllogism (EI = “if”). (6) Five is the 
most important number in mathematics, physiology, philosophy, and music (EI = E, “five”). 
(7) EI means “thou art” and is the address of the consultant to the god, to indicate that the 
god has eternal being (EI = “thou art”) (Plutarch, 1936, pp. 194–195).
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ing occurs. This means that E&E relations and combinations must be con-
stantly re-evaluated due to new differences/preferences that did not exist 
before. This insight into the theory of CAS, along with “unmovable”, ra-
tional, maximised-utility decisions, also speaks for the Stanford School of 
Decision Analysis: for Holzman “a good decision analysis helps the agent 
decide what to do in part by forcing the agents to reconsider what they 
want to get out of the situation they find themselves in. This might mean 
actively creating preferences that didn’t exist before, re-evaluating what 
one wants in life” (Kaplan, 2012, p. 439). The traditional understanding 
of rational decision-making is at odds with Kaplan’s view that “it is our 
actions in the world themselves that are primary, and our reflections and 
discourse about them should often be thought of more as ways of rational-
izing and explaining them than as ways of actually making decisions” (Ka-
plan, 2012, p. 440). Although many decision-makers would rather opt for 
pre-existent, rational decision-making than for instant decision-making, 
the fact remains the people and institutions continually change through 
interaction, as does our decision-making.
Merton is well-known for his unintended consequences of action, which 
he divides into three types: “1. those which are functional for a designated 
system, and these comprise the latent [those that are neither intended nor 
recognized] functions; 2. those which are dysfunctional for a designated 
system, and these comprise the latent dysfunctions; and 3. those which 
are irrelevant to the system which they affect neither functionally nor 
dysfunctionally” (Merton, 1968). Variations, adaptations, (dys)functions, 
and tensions offer an analytical focus within the study of dynamics and 
operative changes during regulation and implementation, and motivate us 
to find a way whereby these elements would not disrupt adaptive stability 
within its normal limits. His less well-known remedy for these elements/
consequences is functional analysis, based on the interpretation of data 
through their consequences (the latter are based on sustained theoretical 
clarification and cumulative empirical research, in which the description 
is not limited solely to the concept of performance in a researched field 
but also includes a systematic account of the people participating and 
the onlookers, of the types and rates of interaction among the performers 
and the audience, and of changes in these patterns of interaction in the 
course of the interpretation of the process) (Merton, 1968)19. His focus 
19 The descriptive protocol of this kind of analysis should, so far as possible, include: 
1) location of participants in the pattern within the social structure–differential participa-
tion; 2) consideration of alternative modes of behaviour excluded by emphasis on the ob-
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on the evaluation of consequences (seeing/understanding an organisation 
through the function it performs) places Merton squarely in the centre of 
our E&E debate. Each case or action has multiple (good, bad, semi-good/
bad, or neutral) consequences, present on different levels. These trigger 
an evaluation problem of the best, worst, and average consequences, 
which becomes all the more important in the salus populi domain. The 
notion of emergence described earlier could explain Merton’s observa-
tion that “activities oriented towar d certain values release processes which 
so react as to change the very scale of values which precipitated them” 
(Merton, 1936, p. 903), or the very process of prediction effects the pro-
cess predicted (the self-fulfilling prophecy). It is therefore highly relevant 
how predictions are made to (dis)enable system adaptations (or Merton’s 
[dys]functions). 
Merton’s unwanted consequences and/or social disorganisation describe 
difficulties that are not fully contrary to intended/purposive actions, but 
focus mainly on side effects: “[t]he composite of faults in the normative 
and relational structure of a social system described as social disorgani-
zation can be thought of as inadequacies in meeting one or more of the 
functional requirements of the system” (Merton, 1961, p. 720). Maybe 
this functionalistic focus pre-empted other elements that might not only 
have a stake in unintended effects, but amplify them: one is the more 
elaborated role of human agency,20 the second is the role of control and 
communications in systems, the third is the role of the system’s innate 
properties (adaptation, emergence, relations, exponential growth, and 
other social systems) and the fourth is that “consensus is not society-wide; 
it is local … each separate social unit maintains not the whole society, but 
its own special needs … and these special interests often conflict” (Par-
rillo, 2005, p. 16). Sieber enumerates seven mechanisms that convert an 
agent’s intentions into the opposite (not the less important) ones: “func-
tional disruption, exploitation, goal displacement, provocation, classifica-
tion, over commitment, and placation. These mechanisms should not be 
served pattern (i.e., attention not only to what occurs but also to what is neglected by virtue 
of the existing pattern); 3) the emotive and cognitive meanings attached by participants to 
the pattern; 4) a distinction between the motivations for participating in the pattern and 
the objective behaviour involved in the pattern; 5) regularities of behaviour not recognized 
by participants but which are nonetheless associated with the central pattern of behaviour 
(Merton, 1968).
20  This variable includes rationalisation of conduct, self-monitoring, goal setting, and 
a host of private motives for action, the relationship of which the system requirements seem 
highly tenuous in the functionalist scheme (Sieber, 1981, p. 32).
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thought of as exhaustive nor … do I have any illusion that the last word 
has been uttered on the dynamics whereby each mechanism produces 
reverse effects” (Sieber, 1981, p. 56). There is no space in this paper to 
describe all unintended consequences, but the fact remains that when one 
talks about emerging unintended consequences, self-precaution is always 
needed: each intervention can cause a new one or represent a change for 
the old ones. Each recommendation can be only a proposal/hypothesis 
that requires further experimentation and/or investigation. Despite the 
difficulties described, one very general note can be made: all CAS are of 
evolutionary nature in which variation, differentiation, selection, and inte-
gration represent building blocks; these should be built into all systems 
of (non-technical) human decision-making, because humans themselves 
are CAS. With these limitations and/or predispositions, in the following 
section a general system of E&E relations will be put forward as a guide 
to what could be relevant on the path of decision-making.
5.  The Best Way to Predict the Future 
is to Create It
In order to create a system of future scenarios, the basic elements of cy-
bernetics will be used because it is (currently) the best branch for inves-
tigating regulatory systems: their constructions, restrictions, and poten-
tials.21 Cybernetics or control and communication in the animal and the 
machine (Wiener, 1961) starts with any scanning process that increases 
the quantity of data and performs individual processes with a high degree 
of accuracy. Large amounts of data require a processing system. The ele-
ments below also try to follow this approach.
5.1.  Functional Prerequisites for the Effectively-Efficient 
System of Public Goals
Numerical processing. Humans and societies are CAS and in studying such 
systems, “we follow what happens to the information” (Gell-Mann, 2002, 
21 Why it is so under-used in the field of the interdisciplinary public administration, 
which in practice it regulates the most, is another question.
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p. 23). Numerical processing is needed22 because a CAS “discovers reg-
ularities in its incoming data stream by noticing that parts of the stream 
have features in common … As time goes on, more and more frozen ac-
cidents, operating in conjunction with the fundamental laws, have pro-
duced regularities. Hence, complex systems of higher and higher com-
plexity tend to emerge with the passage of time through self-organization” 
(Gell-Mann, 2002, pp. 370, 371). Self-organisation is one of the basic 
elements of a CAS, which tends to progress towards a state of equilibri-
um (Ashby, 1960; Foester, 1960; Gershenson & Heylighen, 2003). For 
Ashby, another cybernetician, “a system is any set of associate variables, 
measured as a measurable quantity which at every instant has definite nu-
merical value. The power of control is established when the experimenter 
can force a variable to take any prescribed series of values” (Ashby, 1960). 
As regards numerical processing, Dennet explains “human consciousness 
… in terms of the operations of a virtual machine, a sort of evolved (and 
evolving) computer program that shapes the activities of the brain” (Den-
net, 2012, p. 509), while to Pinker “[t]he mind is a system of organs of 
computation, designed by natural selection … The mind is what the brain 
does; specifically, the brain processes information, and thinking is a kind 
of computation” (Pinker, 1997, p. 21). Discovered regularities through 
(mental) computation are later transferred into decisions or “patterns of a 
higher order” (Beer, 1966, p. 7). The task is therefore to present a human 
being’s subconscious, computing mind more vividly. 
Numerical processing and Bayes theorem. Numerical processing can be per-
formed with the use of Bayes theorem (Ayres & Nalebuff, 2015; Carrier, 
2012; Edwards et al., 2007; Finkelstein & Fairley, 1970; Howard, 1965) 
as one of the clearest mathematical examples whereby a computation of 
belief and/or evidence can be carried out; it is the rule that can support 
people with all our mathematical fallacies,23 and/or our bounded ration-
22 For Wiener (the founder of the field of cybernetics) there are five requirements 
to accomplishing this: a computing machine should be numerical; switching devices should 
depend on electronic tubes; the scale of two for addition and multiplication (rather than the 
scale of ten) should be used; the entire sequence of operations should be laid out on the 
machine itself; and the machine should contain an apparatus for the storage of data which 
should administrate them quickly (Wiener, 1961, p. 4). The more we can measure, quantify, 
establish genuine fact, demonstrate what follows and what does not follow, and calculate 
chance and risk, the less vulnerable need the ultimate decision be (Beer, 1966, p. 10).
23 One of the most common errors is the neglect of the base rate (Kahneman, 2013; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This neglect focuses only on a new specific piece of informa-
tion, while ignoring the general view, and can lead to large exaggerations in the probability 
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ality (Simon, 1983; Simon, 1997). This theorem is a technique of deci-
sion-making based on the determination of higher or lower probability in 
cases of uncertainty; it tells us how our hypotheses and logical premises 
can be more probable. Bayes theorem identifies how beliefs should be up-
dated based on available evidence, and if there is no evidence, how proba-
bilities are distributed between basic alternatives. There is no space in this 
paper to discuss this theorem in full, but it is easily presented by means 
of a decision tree: an event which on the evidence is more likely to have 
occurred (a x b) is assessed in terms of percentage; the same is done for an 
event which based on the evidence is less likely to have happened (c * d), 
and from this the probability of p is calculated: a*b/a*b+c*d. Calculation 
using Bayes theorem predisposes the existence of a system on which in-
formation is gathered and in which changes/trends are spotted, and based 
on which a decision-maker can decide on future actions.24 
Communication. Directly connected with (conditional) probability is com-
munication, i.e., the role which probability plays in the generation of a 
message. For Shannon and Weaver (as “the fathers of information the-
ory”) “the communication system is governed by probabilities which are 
not independent, but … depend upon the preceding choices” (Shannon 
& Weaver, 1964, p. 11). They distinguish between information and mean-
ing, but today meaning might more appropriately be named information, 
while information might be called data. With this correction, the word data 
(not information) “in communication theory relates not so much to what 
you do say, as to what you could say. The amount of data is … to be meas-
ured by the logarithm [to the base 2] of the number of available choices 
… the data [not information], when there are only two choices, is propor-
tional to the logarithm of 2 to the base 2. That is a two-choice situation 
characterized by data of unity, called ‘bit’” (Shannon & Weaver, 1964, pp. 
9–10). There is always an opposite side, and what you could say is closely 
connected with what others (might) say, or “an effective decision is always 
a judgment based on “dissenting opinions” rather than a “consensus on 
the facts” ”(Drucker, 2002, p. 24).
of an event. If we want to express our decisions more rationally, we can use Bayes theorem, 
which is immune to this fallacy.
24 If a state discovers that in some areas a population has a 35% overall presence of 
some characteristic that is especially evident by 15% of people, and that 3% of people do not 
show this characteristic, this means that – although intuitively different, smaller prediction 
– a person who shows (only) signs of this characteristic has more than 73% probability of 
presence of this characteristic.
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System relations within ultrastability. Within this large framework of inputs 
and outputs, three building blocks of systems can be distinguished: the 
first (technical), which addresses the collection and transmission of data 
(through sensory inputs); the second (semantical), which transforms data 
into meaning and/or what can be understood/extracted/classified from 
data as relevant (facts); and the third (effective), which addresses goals 
based on the understanding of data. For the successful administration 
of the system’s component parts and relations, Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety could be helpf ul; it informs us that only variety can destroy variety,25 
i.e., to deal appropriately with diverse problems we need a similar number 
of responses, which are (at least) as distinctive as the problems expressed. 
Only variable, adaptive systems can deal with variety. An adaptable or-
ganism is steered by data from the environment; the organism controls 
its internal essential variables so they will stay within their normal/phys-
iological limits (homeostasis) by the external administration of the envi-
ronment, so that the environment will act on the variables appropriately. 
Ashby speaks of the principle of ultrastability (which is basically the same 
as efficiency (first) and effectiveness (second)): 
The organism that can adapt has a motor output to the environment and 
two feedback loops. The first loop gives the organism non-affective infor-
mation about the world around it, while the second carries information 
about whether the essential variables are driven outside the normal limits 
or not and acts on the (external) parameters. The first feedback loop plays 
its part within each reaction; the second determines which reaction shall 
occur (Ashby, 1960, pp. 82–84).
Feedback and combinations. A system affects the environment and vice 
versa: such a system has feedback. When decisions are made based on this 
(first) feedback, we are talking about the second feedback (back to the 
environment). The system is the whole composite of the organism and its 
environment;26 some property of the system belongs to the whole, to their 
combinations. A variable not included in the system is called a parameter 
and if the same reasoning is applied, a change of parameter value will also 
change the stability of the system in some way (in human reasoning this 
25 “If the variety of the outcomes is to be reduced to some assigned number … variety 
must be increased to at least the appropriate minimum. Only variety … can force down the 
variety of the outcomes.” (Ashby, 1957, p. 206).
26 “An important feature of a system’s stability is that it is a property of the whole 
system … it cannot be related to the parts considered separately … and implies some coor-
dination of the actions between the parts.” (Ashby, 1960, p. 57). 
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part is played by our predispositions from which we draw inferences). The 
ability to be sensitive and adaptive are as much human characteristics as 
societal ones and always indicate some kind of coordination.
The first two characteristics – as any other notion – are established not by 
content per se, but by relations they have with other processes. A human 
being is not a self-sufficient system that receives inputs from the senses 
and discharges them into actions; his or her characteristic activities can 
only be explained as multiple circular processes, emerging from the envi-
ronment into the senses, from where they then go directly – intuitively27 
and emotionally (Goleman, 1996) – or indirectly (as inputs combined 
with or changed by reason) back to the environment. 
Summation of functional prerequisites. The system, data, information, (nu-
merical and/or mental) processing, and self-adaptation based on requisite 
variety are the building blocks of all CASs. They are also reflected in the 
immune system (IS), as our host defence system that encompasses nu-
merous biological structures and processes in an organism that protects 
us against disease. The IS can be divided into the innate and the adaptive 
IS. If a pathogen breaches an external barrier, the innate IS provides an 
immediate but non-specific response. If pathogens evade the innate re-
sponse, the adaptive IS is activated and adapts its reactions during an 
infection to improve its recognition of the pathogen. This improved reac-
tion is then retained after the elimination of pathogen (an immunological 
memory) and allows the adaptive IS to mount faster and stronger attacks 
each time this pathogen is encountered (Restifo & Gattinoni, 2013). The 
elements of IS are similar to the effectiveness (general) and efficiency 
(adaptive, specific) combinations, or to the structural components of so-
cieties,28 where values (such as our parameters and predispositions) are 
27 Kahneman (2013) distinguishes between System 1 (based on intuition) and Sys-
tem 2 (based on reason). 
28 Four structural categories – values, norms, collectivities, and roles – may be related 
to our general functional paradigm. Values take primacy in the pattern maintenance func-
tioning of a social system. Norms are primarily integrative; they regulate a great variety of 
processes that contribute to the implementation of pattern value commitments. The primary 
functioning of collectivity concerns actual goal attainment on behalf of the social system. 
Where individuals perform societally important functions, it is in their capacity as collective 
members. Finally, the primary function of the role in the social system is adaptive. This is 
particularly clear for the category of service, as the capacity to fulfil valued role performances 
is the most basic generalised adaptive resource of any society, though it must be coordinated 
with cultural, organic, and physical resources. Any concrete structural unit of a social system 
is always a combination of all four components (Parsons, 1966, p. 19).
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our “first line of defence”, norms are the general response, and collectives 
and roles are the intra-social and boundary-adaptive responses to harmful 
circumstances. The above-mentioned cybernetic elements (adaptation; 
communication in the technical, semantical, and effective sense; informa-
tion; numerical processing; probability; requisite variety; and ultrastabili-
ty) should also be reflected in the E&E framework of the actions of public 
administration. This is where another paradox lies: why are the elements 
of CAS familiar but not used in legislation that is primarily focused on the 
regulation of CAS (of which people are a representative element)?
5.2.  Requisite Variety of Scenarios in Human Complex 
(Not Yet) Adaptive Decision-Making Systems
It is not superfluous to point out that all CASs are deterministic, i.e., de-
scriptive and understandable, and because of their high sensitivity to con-
ditions, they are also unpredictable: their effects cannot be determined 
precisely in advance, but nevertheless the basic frameworks within which 
they operate can be given. One of the first authors to use the cybernetic 
point of view29 vis-à-vis unintended consequences was Parsons (1966). For 
him the seedbeds for the advancement of adaptive capacity are the pro-
cess of differentiation, adaptive upgrading, integration, value generalisa-
tion, and inclusion. Subsequent authors who used the cybernetic point of 
view in their dealings with paradoxes are Margetts et al. (Margetts et al., 
2012). They took Ashby’s idea of requisite variety (where the homeostatic 
loop of a regulator’s amplifiers [from the regulator to the system] and 
filters [from the system to the regulator] is inserted to deal solely with an 
interested part of the environment) and Douglas’ grid-group cultural the-
ory (Douglas, 1982, 2012). For them, success in modernisation depends 
on requisite variety or on a balance between the three strategies of mod-
ernisation: integration (interconnectedness, standardisation, central con-
29 A society is a type of social system which attains the highest level of self-sufficiency 
as a system in relation to its environments. The self-sufficiency of the system is a function of 
the balanced combination of fixed controls over its relations with five environments [Ulti-
mate Reality, Cultural Systems, Personality Systems, Behavioural Organisms, and the Phys-
ical-Organic Environment] and of its own state of internal integration.  We have referred to a 
hierarchy of control which organises the interrelations of analytically distinguished systems. 
This includes the cybernetic aspect of control whereby systems high in information but low 
in energy regulate our systems higher in energy but lower in information (Parsons, 1966, p. 
9).
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trol, and formal rules), economic rationalism (intensification, economic 
efficiency) and specialisation (scientific advancement, expert knowledge, 
technological development, and quantification) and counterbalance from 
the elementary forms of social organisation – on the hierarchy and indi-
vidualism (that both sustain the three modernisation strategies they in 
turn tend to cultivate), but also on enclaved and isolated orderings (Mar-
getts et al., 2012, pp. 224–227).
Their balance could be placed within the E&E framework, which will be 
presented below (see Figure). The point is, because effectiveness means 
doing the right things, and efficiency doing things right, these terms can 
also be replaced with other notions like justice and fairness, common and 
individual, centralisation and decentralisation, integration and disintegra-
tion, values and norms, natural and technical, planning and adaptation, 
i.e., basically anything that could progress from the abstract towards the 
more specific and vice versa. More than naming, it is relevant to under-
stand the changing nature of the environment in its measured/relevant 
parameters that give data/content to our notions. Here, Campbell’s law 
can help: “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social de-
cision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the 
more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended 
to monitor” (Campbell, 1979, p. 85). Similar to this law is Goodhart’s law: 
“[a]ny observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is 
placed upon it for control purposes” (Goodhart, 1981, p. 111). No indi-
cator per se is the holy grail of success and each fails if too much pressure 
is placed upon it (remember meden agan); not all positive and negative 
effects can be predicted, and the different, multiple and changing sensory 
units come to the fore all the more if thresholds conditions are set for dif-
ferent scenarios. Planning is the next stage after data has been gathered, 
analysed and evaluated. Although the future cannot be predicted in full, 
it can be invented and reflected in different scenarios. 
We know what we (do not) want now (what we do not want is even more 
relevant, because negative consequences are present) and when the fu-
ture comes, attention has to be paid to threshold conditions that require 
different actions planned in advance. Based on what we do not know, we 
can build the technical, semantical, and effective part of a governance 
system, in which probabilities can be calculated to predict government re-
sults, where amplifiers and filters administrate environment variety (from 
the general to the specific, no matter how these are named) and sense as 
many relations as possible to store them and predict future doings with 
the help of a public that should participate in things which are publicly 
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relevant. Thus the problem of ex ante or ex post “emergent findings” of 
arguments for accepted decisions can be minimised, because a more nu-
merous (but independent and variable) group of people can provide more 
relevant results than any expert can do alone (Lamberson & Page, 2012; 
Page, 2008, 2010; Surowiecki, 2005). Without these elements, different 
unintended effects emerge more easily within E&E. The figure below helps 
us to understand the combinations and unwanted consequences between 
E&E, and has intentionally been left without indicators of any kind (e.g. 
the Effectiveness Index or the International Civil Service Effectiveness 
Index), because the focus should be on the framework within which E&E 
relations constantly emerge, evolve, and change in different contexts. Our 
focus should be on all processes whereby negative effects can be uncov-
ered (not just on certain indicators like policy-making, procurement, or 
IT, whilst leaving others unattended) to design social systems that incor-
porate these features that have to be constantly evaluated and changed if 
needed. Even if some rankings of countries can be provided, this cannot 
be an unquestioned recipe for the changes needed.30 This can be put more 
simply as “stay awake at work and be alert to changes” (Figure 1).
In Figure 1 E&E combinations and their effects are vividly presented 
in the form of a decision tree, which is the same one as is used for the 
calculation of subjective (Bayesian) probability. From the decision tree 
intended and harmful effects are seen to be more relevant than unintend-
ed and neutral ones, due to the absence of an active, reasoning human 
component in the latter pair (and indirect consent with unpleasant but 
unwanted, although expected effects). Looking at the decision tree, the 
reader can see th e form of a pyramid on the right, where intended effects 
appear on its peak (the right side of the decision tree represents a mirror 
image of the four known combinations with all unknown-unknowns in 
their background). Results are in time (through energetic, clashing opin-
ions and actions) reflected in values as primary units, which (re)form dif-
ferent perspectives. Sensory units with threshold conditions and different 
30 For instance, according to the Rule of Law Index 2015, Ranking of Happiness 
2015, and Life Satisfaction 2016 Index, Denmark is third-/first-/third-ranking state in the 
world (Helliwell et al., 2016; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2015; OECD, 2016), while according 
to the International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (Blavatnik School of Government & 
Institute for Government, 2017) its civil service is only in the 11th place. Would you rather 
have a state with a better legal environment, happier and more satisfied citizens, or a more 
effective civil service? And how can civil service be so ineffective as to be associated with one 
of the best legal environments and the happiest state in the world? Unity is more about a 
matter of perspective than about an index.
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scenarios (made by planning) are presented as the “Wi-Fi symbol” (they 
can also address the future from the present time). All these elements 
are building blocks for different perspectives whence actions emerge and 
constantly return through a regulatory loop to be repeated and adapted in 
a continuous flow of change. It seems the style of control and command 
regulation is no longer a valid description for many things that happen in 
our mental, technological, and psychological frameworks.
6. Conclusion
In the present time, a time of self-driving cars, it is all the more surprising 
that countries do not use adaptable management systems (it seems this is 
more of a human31 than a technical problem). Governments must recog-
nise/create opportunities to improve the quality of the public sector (the 
31 Already for Hamilton “danger to the rights of the people … is more commonly the 
fault of the head than of the heart” (Hamilton et. al., 2008, p. 13).
Figure 1: Effects of Effectiveness–Efficiency Relations
Source: author’s own construction
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paradox here may lie in general consent with the last sentence, but with 
an absence of real actions).32 Simplification of organisational and proce-
dural structures and processes, an increased use of IT, better regulation 
tools, impact assessments, optimisations of information flow, and the like 
should be placed within a new conceptual framework. This framework 
should include real time-space data sensors, and methods for data eval-
uation as well as for the extraction of meaning and for activating the ap-
propriate means of achieving planned goals. This should be repeated in an 
endless cycle, but it simply cannot be done within the classical command 
and control regulation. Despite all known indicators and indexes, they al-
ways measure something outside their range; therefore, there should be a 
real awareness of an individual always being part of a larger whole, of two 
individuals exponentially forming a larger number of combinations, and 
of relations spontaneously causing new relations and new characteristics. 
The classical, rational decision-making is in the “efficiency camp”, while 
values and principles are in the effectiveness one, but they should be al-
ways intertwined, adapted to contexts of their use and evaluated through 
equity. Rationality per se is deaf and values are blind; the former must 
always be counterbalanced by the latter (the specific by the general and 
vice versa). Between science and people’s lives there is a kind of irony: 
solutions are often known but not implemented, while implementation is 
often carried out for the sake of implementing something. The problem 
of rational decision-making tools (presented in the introduction) lies in all 
three components: in rationality, in the lack of a conceptual structure, and 
in insufficient attention to the ways whereby privileges are retained (many 
times, this is done with the help of banal and incorrect E&E wording). 
Despite advances in science, people are still going hungry in the face of 
an abundance of food, there are the gas and oil pipelines in poor countries 
with no parallel water pipelines, and so on. The last (almost unfair) sen-
tence was not meant to “attack” the reader’s conscience, but to demon-
strate (by means of another paradox of immediate awareness vis-à-vis 
distant actions) that (natural) science without values is merely technical, 
focused on efficiency, while effectiveness (social science) is weak without 
the right technical means. They should not only form deterministic unity 
32 There is no direct connection between what people say they do, and how they actu-
ally act. In the TV series Mind Field (Season 2 – “The Greater Good”) the famous “trolley 
problem” was tested. Unsuspecting subjects were – in the world’s first realistic simulation of 
this moral dilemma – forced to make a life-or-death decision. Only two out of seven de facto 
pulled the lever to divert the train from one to another track, and thus save the lives of five 
but be directly responsible for one person’s death. 
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in Heraclitus’ change and flow, but convince us they are the American e 
pluribus unum (out of many, one) and the European in varietate concordia 
(united in diversity) at the same time. And the last paradox: if regulators 
know all this, why do they not use it? Otherwise, we will all lose it. 
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PUBLIC REFORM PARADOXES AND THE OLD EFFECTIVENESS–
EFFICIENCY PROBLEM
Summary
Although effectiveness and efficiency are old comrades of public administrations, 
they still often cause unintended consequences. The relation between (absent) 
effectiveness and (overly emphasised) efficiency remains unresolved. The paper 
shows that effectiveness and efficiency are still used interchangeably, and despite 
the presence of negative effects, it comes as a surprise that important documents 
still address these terms without procedure or methodology to provide the content 
whereby they could be more clearly elaborated. Not only is the goal to achieve 
clearer meaning, but to accomplish results with the fewest possible negative ef-
fects. Alongside different management reforms, decision-makers must not lose 
sight of the whole; all reforms are only specific answers to inadequate previous 
ones, and it could be valuable to take a step back to see how/why different 
reforms emerge. The paper addresses the success/failure of reforms and the out-
comes thereof. It claims the core problem of rational decision-making lies not in 
rationality per se, but in a lack of concept and/or insufficient attention to the be-
haviour of complex adaptive systems. With the help of complex adaptive systems, 
cybernetics, and combinations of effectiveness and efficiency, the paper presents 
the essential elements for adaptive (human) decision-making (such as diversi-
ty, variation, selection, adaptation, and integration) as the framework whereby 
unintended, reverse, and neutral effects can be reduced. New rules/decisions 
should be based on different levels of planning and adaptation, and on moving 
from the general to the more specific, in accordance with context specificity and 
unplanned, emergent things. It seems the hardest thing to address is the human 
character that does not (want to) recognise a situation as the situation in which 
some things must be spotted, evaluated, and changed if needed.
Keywords: effectiveness, efficiency, complex-adaptive systems, public adminis-
tration, decision-making
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PARADOKSI JAVNIH REFORMI I POZNATI PROBLEM 
EFEKTIVNOSTI I EFIKASNOSTI
Sažetak
Pojmovi efektivnosti i efikasnosti već dugo su poznati javnoj upravi, no ipak 
često dovode do neplaniranih posljedica. Odnos između efektivnosti (koja izos-
taje) i efikasnosti (kojoj se pripisuje prevelika pažnja) ostaje neriješen. Ta se dva 
pojma i dalje upotrebljavaju kao istoznačnice, te s obzirom na negativne učinke 
čudi da se u važnim dokumentima i dalje navode bez procedure ili metodologije 
unutar kojih bi njihovo značenje bilo lakše pojasniti. Cilj nije isključivo po-
jasniti značenje, već ostvariti rezultate uz što manje negativnih učinaka. Kod 
provedbe reformi upravljanja donositelj odluka ne smije izgubiti širu sliku, a to 
je da su sve reforme specifični odgovori na neuspjele prošle reforme, te da korak 
unatrag može biti koristan i pokazati kako reforme nastaju. Rad se bavi (ne)
uspjesima reformi i njihovim rezultatima. Autor drži da glavni problem racion-
alnog odlučivanja ne leži u samoj racionalnosti već u nedostatku koncepta i/ili 
u nedovoljnoj pažnji kada se radi o ponašanju kompleksnih adaptivnih sustava. 
Uz pomoć kompleksnih adaptivnih sustava, kibernetike i različitih kombinacija 
efektivnosti i efikasnosti u radu su predstavljeni temeljni elementi adaptivnog 
(kod ljudi) donošenja odluka (kao što su raznovrsnost, varijacija, selekcija, ad-
aptacija i integracija). Oni čine okvir kojim se neplanirani, suprotni i neutralni 
učinci mogu ublažiti. Nova pravila i odluke treba zasnovati na različitim razi-
nama planiranja i prilagodbe, te na pomaku od općenitog prema određenom, 
u skladu sa specifičnošću konteksta i neplaniranim pojavama u nastanku. Čini 
se da je pritom najteže uhvatiti se u ukoštac s ljudskom prirodom, koja ne pre-
poznaje (ili ne želi prepoznati) bilo koju situaciju kao onu u kojoj nešto treba 
zamijetiti, evaluirati i po potrebi provesti promjene.
Ključne riječi: efektivnost, efikasnost, kompleksni adaptivni sustavi, javna up-
rava, donošenje odluka 
